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On the Legitimacy of the Dengist Regime 
TORSTEIN HJELLUM 
Deng's truth-from-facts willingness to discard outmoded dogmas 
and his black-cats/white-cats readiness to tinker with China's basic 
economic institutions had led him boldly to venture where no 
Chinese leader - no leader anywhere in the communist world - had 
previously dared to go. Early on, Deng decoupled the engine of 
market competition (good) from the stigma of capitalist exploitation 
(bad) and threw open China's doors to the outside world, setting in 
motion a process of accelerated socio-economic development and 
modernization. . . . Rapid but uneven economic growth, accom- 
panied by a deep erosion of traditional ideological norms and social 
controls, produced a situation high in raw entrepreneurial energy 
but low in institutionalized immunity to a wide variety of potential 
systemic disorders, ranging from rising regional inequality and 
uncontrolled rural emigration to a nationwide epidemic of crime, 
corruption, and popular cynicism. All this arguably rendered China 
more volatile politically than at any time since the late 1940s.' 
Introduction 
Every rapid transformation of a society produces problems of legiti- 
macy for the rulers. In this century the Chinese people have experi- 
enced dramatic changes in their society. The market economy has 
achieved a great dynamic momentum. Capitalism in both crude, 
simple and complex form is developing. How do people adjust their 
thinking and their lives to this development? How do the changes 
influence the relationship between the rulers and the ruled? 
No state will survive in the long run if it concentrates its power on 
suppression and violence. The justifications of power need another 
basis: it has to build on feelings, morality, on holy doctrines and on 
some kind of rationality among cultural elites. This thesis has had its 
supporters among political philosophers and ideologists from Plato, 
via Machiavelli, up to the political scientists of today. "The strongest 
man is never strong enough to be always master, unless .he trans- 
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forms his power into rights and obedience into duty'', argued Rous- 
seau, while Hobbes stated that "even the tyrant must ~leep".~ 
Political legitimacy means largely the right to rule. It usually com- 
prises three meanings or components. We can call the first of them 
"self-legitimacy", and this is a set of beliefs that justify to rulers 
themselves their power and actions. We can name the second 
"popular legitimacy", which is the acceptance of the ruling groups 
and their methods by the broad masses. We could name the third 
"external legitimacy", which is the acceptance of the regime and its 
ruling groups by other states and by influential segments of public 
~pinion.~ 
The stability of a regime is dependent on the obedience and com- 
pliance of the people in relation to the rulers. When people subject 
themselves to the rulers, the reason may be that they have no alter- 
native; or they may obey because they are accustomed to being 
obedient; or they obey because they are apathetic or because they 
calculate subordination as most useful to their interests. The legiti- 
macy of a regime, however, is primarily dependent on the feelings of 
obedience based on a normative consensus among the people. The 
legitimacy of a political order may accordingly be defined by the 
degree of normative acceptance by the populace: Are its procedures 
perceived as correct? Are the decisions understood as reasonable? 
And have people the feeling that they are treated fairly? As far as the 
power of a regime is legitimate, the regime has authority. 
We may distinguish between three sources of authority or legiti- 
mate power: 
0 authority based on symbolic authority, based on political mytho- 
logy; 
authority based on institutionalization of political myths into 
constitutions and political structures; 
authority that has its sources in political results or the capability of 
the regime to realize or live up to the commonly accepted political 
myths. 
Consequently, political myths are central aspects in a theory on 
legitimacy. 
Crises of legitimacy are common features of regimes that undergo 
rapid and deep changes. When custom is not a sufficient reason in 
itself for the exercise of power, power relations are challenged. This 
is the situation when traditional power practices are substituted by 
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new practices, as I suggest has been the case in China in the 1980s. 
The reform policies of the Dengists have produced new expectations 
among the people. Their living conditions, especially the material 
conditions of life, are expected to be radically improved by a kind of 
socialism that aims at social equality and solidarity. These expecta- 
tions are highly contradictory. The regime tries to solve these contra- 
dictions by revising old political myths and by constructing new ones. 
The hypothesis is that the justification of the Dengist regime of the 
1990s has increasingly been dependent on its capacity to produce 
results that meet the immediate needs of the people - in spite of the 
ruler's efforts to build its own mythology. This may produce a criti- 
cal situation for the regime: its legitimacy will be dependent on the 
economic performance within a world economic system of competi- 
tive capitalism while the ideological situation tends towards disso- 
lution and anarchy. The stability of the regime may be increasingly 
dependent on suppression and violence if the reform policies result 
in social unrest, as they did in 1989. 
A Historical Perspective 
The mythology of the Dengist regime is a mixture of heritages from 
previous regimes and a result of the regime's own attempts to create 
political myths. Four historical traditions may be of particular im- 
portance: the Confucian tradition from the Celestial Empire; im- 
ported Marxism-Leninism from Europe; Western liberalism; and 
Maoism. When the images of the reforms contradict the political 
myths from the past, in the form these myths are surviving in peo- 
ple's mind, new justifications are needed. The egalitarianism of 
Maoism does not easily accord with the Dengist idea that "somebody 
has to be rich first". Likewise, the collective institutions of Maoism 
and their ideological justifications do not fit easily into the privati- 
zation policies of the Dengists. 
One myth of Maoism was that China's backwardness was a result 
of Western imperialism from the time of the Opium War. This idea 
justified isolationism. As China has opened up to the outside world, 
this idea has lost much of its legitimacy. On the other hand, the more 
open policy may create a need for nationalism as China is becoming 
an integrated actor on the world markets and a part of an interna- 
tional state system. An emerging great power such as China will 
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unavoidably be confronted, both economically and politically, with 
interests and ambitions of other states and nations. New external 
enemies to China may create new bases of legitimation to the Beijing 
regime. They may exploit this possibility in the campaigns of patri- 
otism initiated by the Communist Party of China (CPC). A new 
nationalism may also be a measure to cope with the influence of 
Western ideas of democracy among intellectuals in China as "pollu- 
tion" of "the new imperialism" and the dissolution of old ideas of 
national id en ti tie^.^ 
The Dengists' Attempts to Create a Mythology of Its Own 
The reform policy of Dengism was a revitalization of the moderni- 
zation strategy defeated at the congress of the CPC in 1956. That 
strategy was developed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping after the 
failure of The Great Leap Forward. To legitimize this policy, linking 
it to the past was necessary to justify the discontinuity with the same 
past. The linkage to the past was necessary because the political 
myths of Maoism had a stronghold in people's minds and because 
the leading reform politicians were closely associated with Maoism. 
That was the reason why the history of the Communist Party had to 
be rewritten. The new version was presented as a resolution from a 
plenary meeting of the Central Committee in June 1981.5 In this 
resolution the historical achievements of the party were summed up. 
According to the resolution, the principles of Marxism-Leninism had 
been integrated into the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. 
This synthesis became the thoughts of Mao. His thoughts became the 
guideline to unite the Chinese people under the leadership of the 
Communist Party and to gain victory over feudalism and imperial- 
ism. Furthermore, according to the resolution, the victory of the 
Chinese people inspired people all over the world to fight against 
imperialism. The next twenty-two years led to great achievements: 
e the people became masters of their own country; 
the nation became united; 
the nation had defeated foreign aggression; 
o the principle of distribution, "to each according to his work, was 
put into practice; 
the country was industrialized; 
the agricultural sector was developed after the landlords had 
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been suppressed; 
the fundamental need for food and clothes was met; 
the People's Liberation Army guaranteed peace; 
China, following the principles of proletarian internationalism, 
became a model for exploited people all over the world.6 
(The rulers had propagated this story for years and it coincided with 
experiences of the people.) 
Figure 1: A simplified model for the study of the bases of 
legitimacy of the Dengist regime 
- contradictions of reform policies 
- creation of its own myths 
P 
v 
The Myths of the 
Celestial Empire 
Press from Outside: 
European 
Marxism-Leninism 
According to the party's resolution, grave errors were committed 
after 1957: the Cultural Revolution became a backlash for Chinese 
socialism; the theory of a continued class struggle under socialism 
had been an error and a deviation from Maoism; there had never 
existed a "bourgeois headquarter" inside the party, led by Liu Shaoqi 
and Deng Xiaoping. Most of the participants in the Cultural Revolu- 
tion had placed great faith in the leadership of Mao Zedong, and 
Mao was mainly responsible. However, the Cultural Revolution was 
the failure "of a great proletarian revolutionary". In spite of these 
failures, important advances had taken place in the ten-year period 
1966-76. So far, according to the resolution. 
Deng was in 1981 in the same dilemma that Khrushchev had ex- 
The Myths of 
Maoism 
v 
The Political Myths of 
Western Liberalism 
v v 
The Dengist regime 
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perienced after his speech about Stalin in 1956. He was himself 
jointly responsible for Stalinism, therefore, he had to balance the 
criticism. Such a balancing policy was also necessary because the 
masses of the people were not ready to dethrone Mao. He had also 
to carry out another balancing act. He had allow dissident voices to 
be heard so as to distance himself from the oppression of the Cul- 
tural Revolution. In 1979 he at first welcomed the "democracy wall", 
but suppressed it subsequently when dissidents asked for a fifth 
modernization, a reform of the political system. Had the Dengists 
learned a lesson from the Soviet Union, where dissidents like Sol- 
zhenitsyn and Sakharov had assumed the dangerous role of critics of 
the regime from within the s y ~ t e m ? ~  
The resolution of 1981 explained that because of the short history 
of socialism, it is understandable that errors were committed. Eman- 
cipating China from the influence of feudal political traditions that 
had lasted for thousands of years was not easy. Among the tasks of 
the reformers was the need to institutionalize the political system 
and to change the over-concentration of power. Three years after the 
power takeover by the reformists, the resolution summed up that 
1978 had become "a great turning point in history". 
Nevertheless, the legacy from the Maoist past, with its corrections, 
was not sufficient to legitimize the new regime. The Dengists had to 
create their own political mythology. The notion of "socialism with 
Chinese characteristics" was introduced by Deng Xiaoping in his 
opening address to the twelfth national party congress in 1982: 
We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete 
realities of China, blaze a path of our own and build a socialism 
with Chinese characteristics - that is the basic conclusion we have 
reached after summing up long historical experience.' 
Deng said that this party congress was the most important since 1945. 
The congress that year canonized the thoughts of Mao as the ideologi- 
cal basis of communism in China. Deng wanted to indicate a historical 
divide, but the creation of the notion "socialism with Chinese charac- 
teristics" also had a more pragmatic explanation. The reform policies 
initiated since 1978 had met with objections. Deng argued in favour of 
reforms that could be accepted by as many Chinese people as possible: 
by elite people and by the population at large. Two years after the 
congress, twenty-one of Deng's speeches were published under the 
title Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. The party congress in 
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1992 gave this notion status as a theory. In his report to the congress, 
secretary general Jiang Zemin gave an interpretation of the concept. 
To build socialism with Chinese characteristics had been the aim 
throughout all fourteen years of reform, he told the congress. Mao 
had led the new democratic revolution. Now a new revolution had 
been set into motion. The congress summed up the characteristics of 
this "Chinese socialism" in ten points: 
1) China follows its own path, seeks truth from facts and builds its 
socialism according to its specific experiences. 
2) China is in the initial stage of socialism, an era that will last 
more than a hundred years. 
3) The development of the productive forces (the technology) is 
the most important task. 
4) The object of the structural economic reforms is to develop a 
"socialist market economy". 
5) China has to open up to the outside world to guarantee peace 
and take advantages of the experiences of others. This would 
also include the development of capitalism. 
6) "The four cardinal principles" are the foundation: the socialist road; 
the dictatorship of the proletariat; the leadership of the Communist 
Party; and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong's Thoughts. 
7) Socialism does not mean poverty and social polarization. How- 
ever, somebody has to be rich first if China is to realize the goal 
of prosperity for all. 
8) The Communist Party has the leading role and the army, led by 
the party, should defend the reforms. 
9) "One country, two systems", a peaceful unification of Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan with mainland China: the mainland 
will work for socialism while capitalism will survive in the 
three areas. 
10) To seek truth from facts means pragmatic adjustment of the 
theory. 
These ten points introduced a new notion: "socialist market economy". 
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Table 1: The legitimizing ideas of Dengism compared to political 
myths-of past regimes and western liberalism - 
China 
Institutio- 
nalism 
Concept of 
Ruler(s) 
"All under 
Heaven", The 
Kingdom in the 
Middle 
The Emperor 
religious and 
worldly authority, 
rule by man 
Myths of 
imperial rule 
Son of Heaven 
rules by virtues 
and rites 
I I Ilaw) I 
Conflict IHarmonv ]Class stru~nle I Dictatorial har- ICompetitive par- 
Myths of 
Maoism , 
Mao, a great 
revolutionary, 
teacher of the 
Leadership in 
worldwide anti- 
imperialism 
Dictatorship of the 
proletariat 
through the one- 
party state 
I (Mao, 0n&ztra- mony; priority to liam&tari&rn Idict ion) Istability and 
Myths of 
Denpism 
Contradictory: 
Deng the 
paramount 
concept 
Patriotism; a 
strong and united 
China led from 
Beijing 
Dictatorship of 
the proletariat 
through the one- 
party state; lega- 
lization (rule by 
In 1980 Deng had initiated reforms of party and state institutions. He 
argued that the main obstacles to the reform policies were bureau- 
cracy, concentration of power, patriarchal methods, lifelong tenure 
in leading positions, and different kinds of  privilege^.^ To attack 
such tendencies the party organized a "disciplinary committee". 
They called on veteran cadres to give up their positions and move to 
the newly formed "advisory committee". A programme was set up to 
Myths of 
liberalism 
Sovereignty of the 
people through 
democratic electiom 
Should be civilized 
and similar to We- 
stem democracies 
Rule by law based 
on human rights 
Ideology 
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Mandate of 
Heaven; Confu- 
cianism 
Marxism-Lenin- 
ism-Mao Ze- 
dong's Thoughts 
order 
Socialism with 
Chinese charac 
teristics 
Ideological plural- 
ism 
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establish a new third echelon of leaders. The results seem, however, 
to be meagre, and the veteran cadres continued to play an important 
role in the state and party leadership. Instead of institutionalization 
of procedures, a strengthening of traditional and personal-based 
linkages seems to have been the outcome. 
Confucianism was deeply imbedded in old traditions and institu- 
tions. Marxism drew its strength from a consistent critique of the 
past and a bright vision of the future. Marxism had been systemati- 
cally propagated by the totalitarian state. Both the Celestial Empire 
and Maoism developed powerful mythologies. Compared to Confu- 
cianism and Maoism, the mythology of Dengism appeared incon- 
sistent and pragmatic and only occasionally propagated by a weak- 
ening party machine. The party's ability to convince the people was 
doubtful. 
Popular Legitimacy Tested by a Survey in Larger 
Chinese Cities 
The suggestion that the Dengist "self-legitimacy" is weak - and 
maybe weakening - is not easy to prove. The "popular legitimacy", 
the acceptance of the ruling groups and their methods by the broad 
masses, might prove easier to study simply by asking the people: 
Which economic, social and political needs and wishes do people 
have and how do they expect the government to behave in relation 
to these expectations? To what degree are the people satisfied with 
the efficiency and efficacy of their government? 
This method has also been discovered by the regime itself. Since 
the middle of the 1980s, the Chinese state and the Communist Party 
have initiated surveys among the masses to check out how people 
respond to the reform poli~ies.'~ I shall present below some data 
from a survey in 1993 of 2,285 persons in thirty-nine large cities in 
China.'' 
How do urban Chinese view the social and political situation in 
the country? The answers to a set of questions relating to this reflect 
a population that is strongly critical and dissatisfied. 
60% say that their government is corrupt; 
62% say that the government's efficiency is low; 
63% feel a lack of openness in government; that there is insuffi- 
cient access to information about what is going on at the top level 
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of politics; 
47% feel that law and order in society are deteriorating and that 
there is a growing feeling of insecurity; 
0 48% feel that life chances and opportunities for personal develop- 
ment are unfairly distributed; 
53% say that there is too much lawlessness; 
58% consider that there is a tendency to moral decay; 
0 32% feel that the political situation is unstable. 
If we combine the answers to these eight questions, we find the 
following correlations: persons who feel that the government is 
corrupt, also think that it is ineffective (r=0.59)12; the people who feel 
that the government is ineffective also think that there is a situation 
of moraldecay in the society (r=0.49), and so on. 
Table 2: Correlation between opinions of government and social 
conditions 
fe chances and oppor- 
tunities for personal 
The survey analyses indicate a hard core of critical people compris- 
ing about 15 per cent of the urban population. These people are 
critical to the regime on all eight levels. One third of them have a 
university education - a high ratio compared with the rest of the 
surveyed sample. Workers with low education are, for instance, less 
critical to the regime. 
If we break down the answers to the eight questions by party 
membership, we find that members of the CPC are as critical as non- 
members. It means that people that we would suppose to be the 
most loyal to the regime are not necessarily so. Dissatisfaction with 
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the social and political situation thus represents a potential for un- 
rest and conflict within the ruling party. 
Table 3: Opinions on the government and social conditions 
according to political status (Response in %) 
Statement Member of CPC 
(N=541=100%) 
The government is 
corrupt 
honest and clean 
Government efficiency is 
low 64 
Not a member of CPC 
(N=1553=100%) 
high 
Social morality is 
degenerating 
healthy 
Life chkces and opportunities 
for personal development are 
inequitable 
equitable 
The openness of government is 
1 ow 
high 
In our in-depth interviews, we also met people who were very criti- 
cal of the regime. Did they see any alternative to the ruling party? 
Their answers were negative: "China needs stability. We have no 
alternative to the one-party state. No alternative is possible in China 
today." 
Most Chinese are concerned about the international situation and 
their country's reputation abroad. More than 60 per cent of the inter- 
viewees felt that the reform policy after 1978 had improved China's 
international position. In an in-depth interview, a young female 
student expressed satisfaction with China's growing international 
prestige, a development that she hoped would give China back the 
superpower position it had enjoyed before the invasion of Western 
colonial powers. Campaigns of patriotism initiated by the govern- 
ment may thus have a potential to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
regime. 
The urban Chinese have ideas of what "a good life" should be, but 
they express a widespread dissatisfaction with their actual living 
conditions. On the other hand, they are very satisfied with the im- 
7 
63 
11 
45 
10 
65 
8 
provements in their material living conditions due to the reform 
policies. They are optimistic and have great hopes for future reforms. 
The contradiction between real life and great expectations for the 
future represents a potential for social unrest if the reform policies 
were to experience grave set-backs.13 
Table 4a: Levels of satisfaction with living conditions (Response in %) 
In table 4b, respondents were asked: "Do you agree with the follow- 
ing statements as compared with your own experiences?" 
Table 4b: Statements about the quality of life (Response in %) 
An overwhelming majority (80 per cent) of the interviewees reported 
that their own living conditions had improved during the last fifteen 
years. They felt that the reform policy had been a great success; the 
agricultural reforms were mentioned as the most successful. The 
survey also indicated that 40 per cent felt that they enjoyed more 
political freedom. However, 70 per cent said that they had no influ- 
ence at all in politics, neither at the central nor at the local level. A 
total of 55 per cent felt that "the cultural life" had become richer. As for 
the future of the reform policy, two out of three expressed optimism. 
On the other hand, the negative developments in the society 
which they reported were also ascribed to the reform policies. Two 
out of three felt that the people's mentality had changed for the 
worse. The Chinese had become greedy; everything had become an 
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object of buying and selling. If one wanted to obtain something, one 
I had humbly to ask favours of others, they reported. These results 
I leave us with the impression that the traditional system of guanxi14 is 
I recovering - and that many dislike it. 
I The survey also tells us that the family as a social nucleus plays an 
I 
important role in urban Chinese society. Family relations are re- 
ported as harmonious. This is true for the relations between husband 
I 
I 
I( and wife, and between generations within the family. Two out of 
1 three respondents reported very little quarrelling between family 
members: husband and wife care about each other, they are faithful 
to each other and they have no intention of divorce. Two of three 
report that family members always help one another when there are 
problems. They have a strong feeling of responsibility towards one 
another. When the interviewees were asked about what they would 
do if they were dissatisfied with a specific reform, 65 per cent said 
that they would first discuss the issue within their family. Among 
different options of a good life, a good family life was chosen as the 
most important. The priority is given to care between spouses (70 
per cent), mutual responsibility within the family (53 per cent), good 
relations between generations (35 per cent) and the family as an 
arena of problem solving (31 per cent). 
In an authoritarian political culture, the masses are subjects of 
rule. No political myth tells them that they should be participants in 
politics. On the contrary, prevailing myths tell them that they are 
politically incompetent, and if they engage in politics, they are sup- 
pressed. Maoism in China invited people to participate in politics, on 
the premises of the communists, thus a kind of participating culture 
developed under Mao. How do urban people today look upon them- 
selves, as subjects or participants? Some questions in the survey 
relate to this issue. 
Table 5: "Somebody has to be the leader of our country and make 
decisions on behalf of the rest of us." 
What is your opinion on the following statements? I Agree l~isagree 
"Who rules is not a auestion that the ordinarv citizen I I 
should care about." 
"The main task of ordinary people is to follow the deci- 
sions of the government in the best possible manner." 
"Citizens should openly express their disapproval of 
bad leaders." 
29 
40 
76 
52 
43 
8 
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One third of the respondents think that the rulers should rule and 
that they themselves should obey, which is a typical "subject" per- 
spective. On the other hand, they also think that citizens should 
protest against bad leaders. This may be interpreted in line with the 
Confucian tradition: people have a right to rebel against a ruler who 
has lost his mandate, and against a ruler whose politics do not satis- 
fy the people's needs. In the perspective of legitimacy, the Dengist 
regime has a source of support among a traditionally oriented public 
as long as its reform policies satisfy their wishes for improved mate- 
rial living conditions. 
We may suggest that there exist segments of the population with a 
participative orientation. Among such segments, the system has 
legitimacy if it has decision-making institutions in which they can 
participate. According to the survey, 23 per cent of the urban popu- 
lation are organized in the Youth League of CPC, 24 per cent are 
members of CPC, and 2 per cent are members of a democratic 
party.15 Because people with higher education are over-represented 
in the survey population, these figures may be too high. Anyway, 
they give us an opportunity to compare CPC members with the rest 
of the population. 
The survey tells us that half of the members of CPC have been re- 
cruited since 1982, that is during the era of reform. Membership is 
considered attractive: 44 per cent of the non-members in the survey 
population want to be members. Why is it so? Is the reason that 
membership in CPC opens opportunities of political participation in 
decision-making? 
Table 6: Membership of the Communist Party of China (Response in %) 
Statement Response 
I am a member of the Youth League. 23 
I am a member of CPC. 24 
I am a member of a democratic party. 2 
If you are a member of CPC, when did you join? 
- before 1982 50 
- 1982-89 37 
- 1990-93 12 
If you are not a member of CPC, do you want 
to be a member? 
- ves 44 
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From the in-depth interviews we carried out in Beijing in 1993, it 
was evident that members in the Youth League did not play any role 
in decision-making. Members did not report political activity. The 
same goes for CPC membership, according to the in-depth inter- 
views. However, membership of the party was of importance, ac- 
cording to interviewees, because it is an asset on the job market and 
for your career in a political and economic system where party 
members hold all important positions. 
The interviewees were asked to evaluate their own influence on 
political decisions. Seven out of ten felt that they had no influence at 
all on the national and local government. Only 1 per cent felt that 
they had a great amount of influence. When CPC members and non- 
members are compared, we find that there is a slight difference 
between the two groups. The CPC members are more inclined to 
report influence. The main picture is, however, a feeling of power- 
lessness even among CPC members. 
Table 7: "How much influence do you think you have on the deci- 
sions made by national/local government" (Response in %) 
Degree of influence 
Great amount 
Reasonable amount 
So-so 
Little 
Very little 
None at all 
To be a member of CPC may still be regarded as an honorary posi- 
tion. In addition it may represent a widening of one's network. To 
have guanxi within the party may be of importance. In relation to 
participation in decision-making processes, however, party member- 
ship does not seem to work if ordinary people want to have a say in 
politics. How then would people express their views? 
Most of the interviewees would choose a private solution. They 
would complain to family and friends, a solution they regard as not 
very effective. Some would also report their views to relevant offices. 
They were not asked whether they had ever done so. One third 
National 
government level 
1 
5 
10 
3 
11 
68 
would do nothing. 
Local 
~overnment level 
1 
2 
11 
2 
12 
71 
Table 8: "How much influence do you think you have on decisions 
made by: (a) your national governdent; (b) your local 
government; (c) voting?" (Response in %) 
I (a) Your national ( b) Your local I 
Table 9: "If you are dissatisfied with a reform policy and how it is 
implemented, what would you do?" (Response in %) 
Dissatisfaction with the lack of rights to participate in public life, like 
freedom of speech, organization and voting rights, is widespread 
among the urban population. Between 40 and 50 per cent had no 
opinion and were indifferent. These high numbers support the hy- 
pothesis that many Chinese still do not relate their thinking to civil 
human rights: 30 per cent were not satisfied with their right to per- 
sonal expression; 25 per cent were satisfied. An interpretation may 
be that Chinese people now have more freedom to express their 
views in private than before and more freedom from control of their 
daily life. Such a conclusion received support in the in-depth inter- 
views. On the other hand, the widespread criticism of lack of liberal 
and democratic rights represents a serious problem for the legitima- 
tion of a regime that has been very restrictive regarding political 
reforms. 
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Table 10: Opinions about civil rights (Response in.%) 
Analyses of correlation show that there is a group of people who are 
dissatisfied over the whole range of questions on political rights. They 
can be interpreted to be antagonists of the whole political system. 
Table 11: Correlation between opinions on rights 
Civil right 
The right to know about the 
government work and function. 
The right to express your ger- 
sonal views openly and freely. 
The freedom of the press and of 
publication. 
The right to present suggestions 
and proposals to the leaders of 
your unit. 
The right to criticize your 
government. 
The right to vote. 
The right to participate in all 
kinds of organizations and 
groups. 
The right to assemble and 
demonstrate. 
Correlation coefficient (Pearson's r): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 t  
Who are these potential critics of the system? Who are the indiffer- 
ent? And who are the people that are explicitly positive to the re- 
gime? An analysis of the survey data gives us these estimates: about 
20 per cent of the interviewees are consolidated as critics of the lack 
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of democratic political rights; about one-third are indifferent; and a 
small minority (less than 10 per cent) are satisfied. About 40 per cent 
have an unclear and partly contradictory profile in relation to these 
variables of rights. 
If we group these four categories according to age, sex and politi- 
cal affiliation, we find no statistically significant differences. We find 
party members evenly distributed in the three groups. Of the "sys- 
tem-critical" category, 36 per cent had a university education: this is 
a much higher percentage than in the other categories. The critical 
are also mainly occupied in public areas, like education, health care 
and cultural work. 
Summing Up 
Has the Dengist regime of the 1990s legitimacy? The question is 
difficult to answer, for several reasons: 
The question is formulated in general and an answer will un- 
avoidably cover variations according to region, social groups or 
classes, generations, etc. An answer will under all circumstances 
represent a rough simplification. 
There is a lack of relevant data; our data are narrow in scope and 
are not representative for the population as a whole. 
To measure the strength of myths in a population requires more 
probing methods than a structured mass survey can accomodate. 
In spite of problems like this, the question'of legitimacy has always 
been of core interest to political scientists (and to all political re- 
gimes). On the basis of the survey we can at least draw a number of 
conclusions: 
The Chinese have expectations vis-A-vis their rulers based on 
political myths of the past. They expect a ruler to behave accord- 
ing to some conventional virtues. Therefore, they are very critical 
of the corrupt character of the Dengist regime: it is not effective in 
its performance and it does not handle the citizens on an egalitar- 
ian base - an idea propagated by the past Maoist regime. 
The Chinese political culture is predominantly a subject political 
culture. However, the Chinese do have expectations of their rul- 
ers. Measured by these expectations, the majority seem to have a 
mainly negative attitude to the regime, with one very important 
exception: the reform policies have benefited most Chinese and 
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mainly negative attitude to the regime, with one very important 
exception: the reform policies have benefited most Chinese and 
improved their life materially. Most Chinese are optimistic. They 
think that their lives will improve thanks to the further success of 
the reform policy. 
On the other hand, the regime is blamed because of the unavoid- 
able (?) problems which "modernization" produces: a dissolution 
of social order and decay of social morality. 
Instead of an institutionalization of politics, and the development 
of an "organizational mode of association" as in Western societies, 
the traditional "differential mode of ass~ciation"'~ where guanxi is 
the key to achieve one's interests, is strengthening. The ordinary 
Chinese may not be satisfied with such a development. The role 
of the family may be strengthened after the set-back of the collec- 
tive experiments of Maoism. 
Most urban Chinese do not have a participatory attitude to a 
political system based on ideas of individual rights and duties. 
Only a small minority are demanding political rights associated 
with Western democracies. This minority have no political alter- 
native and are not ready to start building a political alternative to 
the existing regime. On the other hand; the lack of access to the 
decision-making processes combined with a possibly growing 
dissatisfaction with the regime may constitute a destabilizing 
factor. 
In the eyes of ordinary Chinese, the Dengist regime may have lost 
much of its "Mandate of Heaven". Many of them may think they 
have a right to rebel; however, their actions will be limited by the 
wish to avoid social turmoil or anarchy in the society. The one- 
party state will continue as a virtue of necessity.17 
The effects of the regime's effort to construct its own political 
myths ("Socialism with Chinese characteristics") are not easy to 
measure. Perhaps its ambitions are limited to appeasing frustra- 
tions among older generations of Chinese over vanishing utopian 
ideas of communism. On the other hand, national pride may be 
strengthened and nourished by the rulers, via China's economic 
and political growth as a big power." 
Among ordinary members, party membership does not seem to 
function as an opportunity to participation or as a channel of in- 
fluence. Furthermore, membership does not necessarily equate 
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with loyalty to the regime. Party members are also very critical of 
the efficiency and efficacy of the system. 
My hypothesis from the outset was that the justification of the Den- 
gist regime will be increasingly dependent on its capacity to meet 
the immediate needs of the people, and that the regime's own efforts 
to construct its own mythology will be limited. I feel that the data 
from the survey in 1993 support this hypothesis. The "popular le- 
gitimacy" of the regime seems causal. If so, the regime is encum- 
bered with a serious weakness. 
What may happen with China in such a situation? I am inclined to 
make Adam Przeworski's words my own: 
... imagine that the authoritarian regime suffers a loss of legitimacy 
but no alternative regime is accessible, that is, no coherent 
alternative is politically organized. What would then happen? This 
is clearly a question open to and inviting an empirical investigation, 
but I do have a guess: nothing much.19 
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